Within a Closed-loop Supply Chain (CLSC) framework we study several consumer return behaviors for the used products which are based on the product prices and rebates. Consumers evaluate the rebate they receive as well as the price of the new product before deciding whether to dump a return. Therefore, the number of used products returned is examined under two types of rebates: a …xed rebate and a variable rebate. We search for the optimal rebate mechanism and …nd that the CLSC pro…ts are higher under an variable rebate policy. This …nding justi…es the industry practices that employ a rebate mechanism based on both the value and the price of used item. We o¤er two types of solution concepts to the CLSC games: open-loop Stackelberg solution and Markov perfect Stackelberg solution, which are commonly employed in the dynamic games literature. While we mainly employ Markovian equilibrium, we also allow …rms to utilize open-loop strategies so as to assess the impact of precommitment on the market outcomes.
Introduction
It is well documented that consumers adopt socially and environmentally responsible behavior by properly disposing o¤ their end-of-use products rather than dispersing them into land…lls (Souza, 2013) . This result is due to the recent changes in business practices to manage the returns within Closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) frameworks. In the last two decades, …rms designed ad-hoc policies to enhance the consumers'sensibility in environmental issues by sponsoring the "green consciousness"for the future generations (Bakker, 1999; Pattie, 1999) and their commitments to reduce the impact of their products and processes (Guide, 2009 ). Among the numerous environmental targets, …rms posed a considerable attention on the backward ‡ow management, which involves the implementation of atypical managerial practices, such as product acquisition, reverse logistics, points of use and disposal, testing, sorting, refurbishing, recovery, recycling, re-marketing, and re-selling (Guide and Van Wassenhove, 2009, Fleischmann et al., 2001) . The literature called this strategy value stream approach or active return approach, to highlight the …rms'commitments and e¤orts to perform the number of returns as well as economic convenience and environmental feasibility of these policies. For example, Savaskan et al. (2004) , Savaskan and Van Wassenhove (2006) , and De Giovanni and Zaccour (2014) characterize an active return approach in which the returns increase in the collector's promotional e¤orts.
Although these frameworks demonstrate the economic advantages as well as the environmental and social bene…ts obtainable from an active return approach, the businesses realized that these policies do not provide competitive advantage any more (Simpson et al., 2004) . Rather they are perceived as a default orientation to be established independently of other factors. In fact, …rms in almost all sectors take care of their past-sold products, adopt an active return approach and continuously advertise their socially responsible corporate attitudes. In other words, all …rms responsibly manage their returns; consumers are fully aware of the …rms' green programs and know that their returns will be surely treated responsibly (Baker, 1999) .
Consequently, a marketing strategy aiming at increasing the number of returns as well as the environmental recognition is marginally e¤ective because all …rms within an industry do advertise their green initiatives.
Indeed, when consumers must choose between goods produced by a grey and a green manufacturer, they will most likely choose the latter because of its environmental initiatives (Atkin et al., 2012) . Nevertheless, when consumers must choose between goods produced by two green manufacturers, there is no competitive advantage linked to being green (De Giovanni, 2016). Rather, it becomes a compulsory feature. Thus, the …rms' attention is moving from sponsoring their green orientations to putting in place some more e¢ cient mechanisms to increase the returns. In particular, recent programs are based on providing some generous economic incentives in forms of rebates (e.g., trade-in programs) to engage consumers in returning their used products. For example, since H&M has launched its Garment Collecting Initiative in 2013, customers from every corner of the world have helped recycle 25,000 tonnes of their unwanted clothes (www.hm.com). H&M pays a …xed per-bin rebate to consumers, independently of the textile products put in the bin, to be used for future purchases. Similarly, Dell has initiated the DellReconnect project, which is a partnership between Dell and Goodwill, and encourages responsible electronics recycling. When consumers return their used electronics to a Goodwill (2,000 locations across the US), they receive a …xed per-ton tax discount rebate independently of the returns'types and conditions (www.dell.com). Lexmark started the "Prebate" program in 1998, where customers could get $30 rebate o¤ a $230 toner cartridge if they return the used cartridges back (Majumder & Groenevelt, 2001) . Apple Recycling Program allows PowerOn to administer and manage the return and recycle of Apple's products. For any return quali…ed for reuse, the consumers receive a gift card to be used in the Apple stores whose amount depends on the results of the product's evaluation (Apple.com). Similar mechanisms are used for automobiles (Autotrader.com), books (Amazon.com), video games (Gameshop.com), and consumer electronics (BestBuy.com).
According to these cases, the …rms enhance the consumers' attention through environmental issues by providing two types of rebates: a …xed rebate that does not depend on the returns' type, original price or conditions (e.g., apparel of H&M, and electronics of DellReconnect) and a variable rebate that can depend on all of these features (e.g., electronics of Apple, cars of Peugeout, cartridges of Lexmark). In this paper, we will seek to capture this distinction by modeling an active return approach in which the rebate can be either …xed or variable and depending on market value/price of the product. We will formulate the variable rebate as a function of the purchase price. Clearly, there is a certain relationship between the rebate and the retail price. Firms o¤er a high rebate if consumers paid a high price to purchase a product. In fact, the retail price is a proxy of the product quality (e.g., technology updates). Furthermore, consumers are likely to properly treat and responsibly use the product when they spend a high amount. The comparison of the two types of rebates will inform on the best option that …rms within CLSC should adopt to improve their economic and environmental performance. The return functions that we employ will not only depend on the rebate but also on the price that consumers pay for a new product, according to the intuitive principle for which consumers need to purchase a new product to continue to satisfy their needs after their return (e.g., De Giovanni et al., 2016). According to these business practices and evidences, we will model the return functions that will depend on both the rebate, which can be either …xed or variable and depending on the retail price, and the new product price.
This way of formulating the returns provides a novel approach in the CLSC framework. While the prior papers have developed several rebate programs, they have mainly focused on B2B relationships. Consequently, the incentive mechanism is designed for collectors rather than for consumers. For example, Ferguson and Tokay (2006) model a setting in which a rebate is o¤ered to retailers when the false returns do not exceed a certain amount. Savaskan et al. (2004) and Savaskan and Van Wassenhove (2006) use an exogenous rebate (e.g., a fee) to retailers per each unit returned. Similarly, Atasu et al. (2013) characterize a …xed incentive for collectors and highlighting the conditions according to which the incentive pushes the collector to collect all past sold products. Nevertheless, no incentive is provided to consumers for impacting their return decisions. De Giovanni (2014) shows that CLSC can be e¤ective when a …xed rebate embedded on a reverse-revenue-sharing contract is proposed to a retailer. Corbett and DeCroix (2001) examine exogenous shared-savings contracts to overcome incentive con ‡icts between a supplier and a buyer to reduce the use of indirect materials. Ferguson and Toktay (2006) model an incentive that assumes a form of target rebate for a retailer; the mechanism increases the retailer's wishes to invest more in green activity programs and perform the reverse ‡ow management. Ray et al. (2005) use a price mechanism in the form of trade-in rebate to enhance customers' willingness to repurchase. Bakal and Akcali (2006) compares various forms of perunit acquisition price showing that the exogenous rebate works well in terms of operational performance. De Giovanni (2015) shows that a per-unit rebate incentive given to a retailer is never preferable than a mechanism based on the overall CSLC performance and the retailers' commitments to environmental issues. Wu and Zhou (2017) model a CLSC in which the product collection can be done either by a manufacturer or by a retailer; in the latter case, the manufacturer supplies a …x incentive to the retailer to increase the return rate, Orsdemir et al. (2013) model the quantity to be remanufactured as a decision variable without involving any type of incentives, neither for supply chain members nor for consumers. Di¤erently, Wu (2012) assume that the return rate is a …xed percentage of the past-sold product, being therefore rebate-independent. This literature stream highlights that CLSC incentives have been mainly designed for collectors rather than for consumers. Therefore, in our paper, we seek to contribute to this body of knowledge by modeling a return function in which the rebate is o¤ered to the consumers rather than to collectors. Ostin et al. (2008) refer to this approach as "credit system" because the collector supplies an incentive directly to consumers to return their old cores according to some features (e.g., price and quality); these credits can be used for future purchases. We model a game in which the manufacturer manages the returns exclusively, and reinforces the B2C relationships by proposing either a …xed or a variable rebate. As reported in a recent review by Souza (2013) , only two papers dealt with trade-in programs for consumers: Ray, Boyaci, and Aras (2005), and Li, Fong, and Xu (2011). Ray et al. (2005) assume that the returns may carry out some value and can be traded-in through discount policies that are dependent on the used product's age or independent of the product age, or there is no trade-in discount. Di¤erently, Li et al. (2011) provide a forecasting method for trade-in programs based on customer segmentation. In addition, Govindan and Popiuc (2014) model a return rate that linearly depends on a discount o¤ered to consumers. Kaya (2010) model a return quantity that linearly depends on the rebate (incentive) o¤ered to consumers. She characterizes several scenarios considering deterministic and stochastic frameworks as well as centralized and decentralized solutions. In all cases, when the rebate plays an important role in the return function, the decision maker always supplies larger incentives and earns higher pro…ts. He (2015) designs an incentive for consumers that can act either linearly or non-linearly in the return function showing that an optimal rebate always leads to a concave function and maximizes the decision maker payo¤s. Our contribution takes position within this framework in which the incentive (a rebate) is o¤ered to consumers. Di¤erently from the literature, consumers'return behaviors are very sophisticated and depend on both the price to be paid for purchasing a new product and the rebate. So, when the price of purchasing a new product is large, consumers show a lower willingness to return products. When the rebate is large, consumers' returns increase. Contrary to the literature that mainly models a rebate as a decision variable, we model the rebate as a function of the price paid for purchasing the product in the past. Therefore, consumers will decide whether to return a product according to the evaluation of the good they purchased and the sacri…ce linked to purchasing a new product. This return function in fact re ‡ects the reality as such collectors evaluate a return according to its original market value, which is mainly exempli…ed by the original retail price (e.g., BestBuy, Apple).
The motivation for pursuing a framework in which the manufacturer handles the collection has both theoretical and practical dimensions. From a theoretical perspective, the research in the selection of a proper CLSC structure demonstrates that when gains from the collection process are high, the manufacturers prefer collecting themselves only (De Giovanni & Zaccour, 2013). For instance, Guide (2000) reports that 82% of …rms collect directly from customers, while Xerox carries out the product collection process alone and performs 65% return rate. From a practical perspective, the cases in which the OEMs collect directly from the consumers either through ad-hoc programs or through their store-brands are very common, as mentioned for the cases of Apple, H&M, and Lexmark.
Besides providing some theoretical developments, we also propose some methodological advancements in the context of CLSCs. Speci…cally, we adopt two di¤erent solution concepts, namely, open-loop and close-loop (or Markov perfect) equilibria in Stackelberg setting. The validity and adoption of these concepts depends on the …rms' availability to optimally decide their strategies according to the current state information (Markovian strategy), or by just committing to a set of actions to be adopted over the time (Open-loop strategy). The Open-loop equilibrium has been conveniently used in the dynamic games literature because of being tractable for solving large-scale dynamic games (Genc et al. 2007 ), providing a benchmark solution that can be compared to more complex strategies (Genc and Zaccour, 2013) several other contests such as in the supply chain (e.g., Gaimon, 1998; Kogan and Tapiero, 2007) and in the marketing channel (e.g., Jørgensen and Zaccour, 2004) . In our CLSC framework, the comparison between open-loop and Markov perfect equilibria informs on the best approach that the …rms should adopt to set their strategies in real businesses to better perform from an economic and the environmental perspectives.
To capture the dynamic aspects of the CLSC we model a two-period game (which can be easily extended to T > 2 periods for a …xed rebate case as discussed in the conclusions section), in which the manufacturer sets the wholesale price and the retailer sets the retail price in both periods. Consumers who purchase in the …rst period can decide to return their used goods in the second period according to a price-driven return function. We solve the games and compare the strategies using Markov perfect and open-loop equilibrium concepts under two di¤erent rebate policies.
Compared to the literature, we provide two main novelties:
1. We search for the best return policy by investigating two types of rebates, namely, …xed and variable rebates. Thus, consumers play a strategic role within our framework and their return behavior substantially in ‡uence the …rms' strategies and payo¤ functions. Also, this is the …rst attempt to model some return functions that are consistent with real policies established by …rms. For instance, the return strategies undertaken by H&M and Apple aim at increasing the returns but providing a …xed and a variable rebate, respectively. Therefore, we answer the question: Which of these mechanisms should …rms implement to increase their payo¤ functions? ii) …xed and variable rebates in the return functions; iii) di¤erent information structures and equilibrium solutions; iv) dynamic interactions between the decision variables over time. To our knowledge, the previous papers have not considered comprehensive return behavior and rebate mechanisms to be implemented in the CLSC games involving B2C relations. Although some formulated CLSC games over …nite time horizon they were static in the sense that the decisions were not interlinked over the periods of the game. Also, they have not provided equilibrium solutions under di¤erent information structures.
As we o¤er a richer modeling approach in CLSC context, we …nd some interesting results: a) when the CLSC adopts Markovian solution concept, larger …xed rebates have a positive impact on …rms'pro…ts and consumers' surplus. Nevertheless, this outcome is not environmentally sustainable as the returns decrease; b) when the CLSC adopts a Markovian solution concept, larger variable rebates show contrasting e¤ect on …rms' pro…ts: the manufacturer prefers lower rebates while the retailer prefers larger rebates, which is mainly due to the independence between the retailer's pro…ts and the remanufacturing outcomes; c) when the CLSC adopts an Open-loop solution concept, …xed rebates should always be preferred because they lead to higher pro…ts and better social outcomes and environmental performance in most of the cases; d) when the consumer return behavior is re ‡ected by a …xed rebate return function, …rms will be indi¤erent between using either a Markovian or an Open-loop concept because of the independence between forward and backward ‡ows; e) when the consumer return behavior is explained by a variable rebate return function, …rms' preferences diverge: the manufacturer would always adopt a Markovian solution concept while the retailer would adopt an Open-loop concept. Further, a Markovian solution concept is socially optimal and environmentally unsustainable, while an Open-loop concept allows a CLSC to achieve good environmental performance it deteriorates the social welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the CLSC model with endogenous return functions. the two di¤erent rebate types. Section 6 o¤ers some practical managerial insights to business …rms in CLSC, and section 7 concludes the paper with future research directions.
A two-period model of CLSC
We model a two-period game with a manufacturer, player M , and a retailer, player R. The two …rms work in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) and strategically make pricing decisions over the two periods under investigation, t = 1; 2. In particular, M sets the wholesale price, ! t ; and R optimally sets the retail price, p t :
Consumers also take part in the CLSC by deciding whether to buy a product in t = 1 and return the used product and buy a new one in t = 2. Assumption 1. Consumers set their purchasing decisions based on the retail price In each period according to the following demand function:
where t and denote the market potential and the consumer's sensitivity to price, respectively. Notice that demand function in Eq.
(1) has been largely used in the CLSC literature (e.g., Savaskan et al. 2004) because it allows one to concentrate on the operational aspects of a problem while keeping the solution su¢ ciently tractable. Also, observe from the demand equation that demand intercept changes over time.
This is because some customers who return their products can purchase in the second period. In addition, the market conditions as well as macroeconomic conditions may change in the second period. We re ‡ect these changes in our demand function by the parameter which has a time subscript and represent the market potential. Essentially demand in the second period can shift up or down that we do not restrict which way the market goes. On the other hand, we expect the same behavior by the consumers so that we keep the price sensitivity parameter constant across the periods. This is because the consumers come from the same pool with certain price responsiveness. Of course, we will assume that the quantity demanded at a given price holds q t (p t ) > 0 both in analytic and numerical solutions.
An important feature of a CLSC model is to uncover value-added in operations by saving costs through processing return (Souza, 2013) . Accordingly, we assume the following return function.
Assumption 2. When consumers receive a variable rebate, the return function takes the form:
The interpretation of Eq. (2) is as follows. When consumers seek to return a product, they indeed evaluate the price of new product available in the market to check whether they can a¤ord it. Higher second-period retail price p 2 will discourage consumers to return their products. We can empirically prove that there exists a linear relationship between returns and pricing. By combining the data collected Notice that this return function captures two fundamental paradigms that have been introduced in the CLSC literature, that is, a waste vs. a value stream collection approach. According to the waste stream approach, remanufacturers are barely interested in economic and operational perspectives; thus, …rms do not invest in the implementation and management of recycling process, which implies that quality, quantity, and timing are uncertain while remanufacturing costs and opportunities are not at all aligned (Guide et al. 2003 ).
Rather, they passively wait for the return of past-sold products. That is, remanufacturing is considered a cost-center practice that only creates marginal value and opportunities (Guide et al. 2006 ). In Eq. (2) a passive return approach is modeled when = 0 holds and > 0; which represents the number of consumers who voluntarily return the product independently of the …rm strategies. In contrast, the adoption of a value stream approach relates to all situations in which the remanufacturing process is largely convenient, thus the value that can be obtained from returns is considerably large. Accordingly, …rms continuously invest in all backward activities to successfully perform the collection process (De Giovanni, 2015). In Eq. (2), > 0 captures the e¤ectiveness of an active return approach, according to which consumers'willingness to return depends on the product prices over the two periods investigated. Therefore, …rms adopt a passive return approach when = 0; and a value stream approach when > 0. Finally, is the maximum amount that the collector will receive back. Therefore, we will constrain the return rate to be at most equal to :
As mentioned earlier, some CLSCs (e.g., H&M's CLSC) base their rebate on a …xed amount (e.g., per-bin rebate) that does not depend at all on the original price that consumers paid for the product. In this case, Eq.
(2) does not cover H&M's CLSC. Then, we assume an alternative return function, v(:), that takes the form.
Assumption 4. When consumers receive a …xed rebate, the return function takes the form:
where k is a …xed rebate that consumers receive when returning their past-purchased products. Di¤erent than Eq. (2), consumers only evaluate the …xed rebate and the price of a new product in the second period before deciding whether to return the used product. The exogenous rebate represents a …xed amount that is independent of quality, condition of the good, and its original price. This approach has been recently used by Gönsch (2014) , where a collector o¤ers a …x acquisition price (e.g., k in Eq. 3 ) and
compare it to a bargained acquisition price. In the automotive sector, for example, this return function is generally applied to a consumer who returns a very old car, so he/she receives a lump-sum from either a dealer or the government who recycle the used cars responsibly. Similarly, H&M o¤ers a …xed rebate for any bin that a consumer returns, independently of its content. In U.S., people can collect cans and bottles and redeem them through an ad-hoc machines to get a …x amount. For example, in Californians can earn 10 cents for 24-ounce, or 5 cents for smaller ones (Stevens, 2017) . The incentive payment that we propose in Eq. (3) takes inspiration from these situations, where k is the …x acquisition price.
Assumption 5. Independent of the values of ; and k; v (p 2 ) :
Even when the CLSC o¤ers a …xed rebate, the maximum amount of consumers who will return the product will be ; thus we will consider the constraint v (p 2 ) . The market outcome comparison between these two return functions will lead the decision maker to determine the payment policy for the used products.
Speci…cally, the di¤erences between prices and pro…ts will inform the …rm preferences for the return policy.
Assumption 6. M 's markup from selling the good is given by Mt = ! t c t :
! t represents its wholesale price, while c t > 0 is the marginal production cost, which we assume to be constant over time. In solving …rm's optimization problem we will constrain Mt > 0 to admit feasible equilibrium solutions.
Assumption 7. Under r return function, M 's the value of a returned product is given by Mr = g p 1 :
is the return residual value that we assume to be constant, independent of time and condition of the good. g is the constant marginal collection cost and includes all costs associated with the backward logistics activities. p 1 is the variable rebate that M pays to a consumer who returns a past-sold product according to (2) . Finally, we constrain Mr = g p 1 > 0 to highlight the economic convenience of remanufacturing and determine the M 's willingness to shift from a waste to a value return approach or vice verse.
Thus, R does not receive any bene…t from the return process and consumers directly return products to M . In …rm's maximization problem, we will constrain Rt = p t ! t > 0 to obtain feasible solution for the retailer. Although the R is not at all involved in the collection process, she has a substantial in ‡uence on the return quantity as the returns exclusively depend on the retail prices according to Eqs. (2) and (3).
Given the above assumptions 1-8, we write …rms'pro…t functions under the variable rebate policy:
where q 1 (:), q 2 (:), and r(:) are functions of retail prices and is the discount factor, which is assumed to be common to both players. Also, the pro…t functions must satisfy M > 0 and R > 0:
Also, given the above assumptions, …rms'pro…t functions under the …xed rebate policy can be written as follows:
Under the exogenous rebate regime, we employ the return function v (p 2 ) rather than r (p t ) and the rebate k instead of p 1 . Also pro…ts should hold M > 0 and R > 0:
The game is played á la Stackelberg where M is the leader and maximizes his discounted sum of pro…ts by optimally setting the wholesale prices over the two periods. Being the follower of the game, R maximizes its pro…t function by optimally choosing the retail prices in the two periods. In the …rst period, M chooses ! 1 to maximize his pro…t, while R takes ! 1 as given and chooses the retail price p 1 to maximize her pro…t.
M also considers the second period collection decisions that a¤ect his current and future pro…ts. In fact, in the second period, some of the customers decide to dump their past-purchases. In period two, M introduces a new product. While the second period prices ! 2 and p 2 are obtained as described in t = 1, M also considers the return of past-sold products. The return process also a¤ects the R's retail prices through the wholesale prices. 
Markovian equilibrium with variable rebate (M -scenario)
In this section, we characterize outcomes of the CLSC game under Markovian equilibrium strategies with the variable rebate in r(p t ), thus named M scenario. In each period, the M is the leader and optimally chooses the wholesale price ! t , and next R optimally chooses the retail price p t . In addition, M collects some past-sold products to be remanufactured in t = 2. To …gure out Stackelberg equilibrium outcomes we solve the game backwards. This is because the current decisions impact the future strategies and pro…ts.
The pro…t functions for both players are given in Eqs. (4)- (5) and the return function is as in Eq. (2) . The detailed solution of the game is given in the Appendix and the equilibrium strategies are summarized in the following propositions.
Proposition 1 With the variable rebate, the Markovian pricing strategies are given by:
where is a constant term that consists of a complex network of relationships among all model parameters.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that in addition to the Assumptions 1-8, the expressions in the strategies should be positive so that all prices are positive.
Observe that the …rst-period wholesale price heavily depends on all parameter values 1 and also in ‡uences the retailer's strategies. As there are 13 parameters, we face involved expressions. To make the model outcomes more tractable, we will …x some minor parameters in order to focus on the key features of the strategies. Thus, we …x the following parameters:
i. = 1 : …rms give the same importance to present and future cash ‡ows in two periods.
ii. c t = 0: the marginal production cost is normalized to zero.
iii. = 1 : consumer price responsiveness is unity (any marginal price increase implies marginal sales decrease of the same amount).
iv. = 1: active return response to price changes is unity.
Note that if the return is assumed to be passive, then = 0 holds in any return function.
With this simpli…cation the …rst-period wholesale price becomes:
thus entailing more analytically tractable function.
Proposition 2 Higher consumers' willingness to voluntarily return past-sold products ( ) leads to lower pricing strategies.
Proof. Compute
< 0; as 2 (0; 1) : Then, use the Envelop Theorem to check that:
Interestingly, a large voluntary return rate leads …rms to reduce their prices at all CLSC levels for all periods. The idea behind this result is intuitive: When more consumers are willing to voluntarily return the past purchases, M lowers p 1 to increase his pro…ts. This is evident from the M 's bene…t from a return M2 = g p 1 . Consequently, the voluntary return rate has a positive in ‡uence on the …rm sales (i.e., Proof. Use Eq.(12) to compute to check that
Substitute the …xed parameters i-iv and Eq.(12) into Eqs. (9) ; (10) and (11) to check that:
Opposite signs apply when computing these derivatives with respect to g.
This result is in line with the previous CLSC literature, e.g., Savaskan et al. (2004) , according to which when the bene…t of remanufacturing is large, i.e., g > 0; the M conveniently remanufactures returns without worrying about the sale reduction that eventually occurs. Note that, in equilibrium, the …rst-period strategies change with opposite sign with respect to the second-period strategies. Higher remanufacturing e¢ ciency leads …rms to charge larger prices that, although it pushes down the demand, exert a positive in ‡uence to the pro…ts, as it is displayed in Figures 1 and 2 .
Proposition 4 Any active return approach ( > 0) results in higher prices.
Proof. Substitute conditions i iii and = 0 in Eq.
; which is the …rstperiod wholesale price under a passive return policy. Use Eq. (12) to show that
> 0: Then, use conditions i iii and the Envelop Theorem to show that:
When the consumer returns are based on the product prices ( > 0), consumers tend to return a lower number of used products relative to the product returns under passive return approach ( = 0). This causes less backwards pro…ts. Also, as more consumers hold on to their used products, lower number of consumers is expected in the second period. These two reasons lead to …rms to charge higher prices to o¤set the lost pro…ts due to the lower sales under the active return approach. Alternatively, as the product is more "durable"
(more consumers hold on to the used product), prices should be higher.
Proposition 5 A large rebate rate given to consumers pushes …rms to charge lower prices.
Proof. Use Eq. (12) to check that @!1
The rate of rebate measured by has several e¤ects for the manufacturer pro…ts and prices. The …rst one is the "cost e¤ect": the larger the rebate the larger the cost to the manufacturer. The second one is the "revenue e¤ect": as the value of return is positive, i.e., M2 = g p 1 > 0 it is economically convenient to remanufacture and give a rebate. Furthermore, the larger the rebate the higher the number of returns are (as r is increasing in ). Therefore, M 's backward pro…t increases in rebate rate. The third one is the "sales e¤ect": the larger rebates can increase the sales of new product so that quantity demanded will increase.
This will pressure down the …nal sale price for the retailer. M will react to lower retail price by decreasing its wholesale price charged to the retailer. whether the number of returns are low or high, the R's pro…t increases in the rebate rate. This is mainly due to the increased number of sales. Because the wholesale and retail prices decrease in the rebate rate (Proposition 5), the quantities sold in both periods rise. As the change in price-cost margin (the retail and wholesale price di¤erential) is lower than the rate of increase in the sales, the pro…ts increase. Also, observe that the highest level of R's pro…t is attained when = 0, that is when the return quantity is the maximum.
Markovian equilibrium with …xed rebate ( f M -scenario)
Similar to the M -scenario, we will characterize the closed-loop supply chain game assuming that the consumer rebate is …xed and the return function varies with the second-period price (Eq. (3) ), namely f M scenario.
While this setting follows a similar structure with the previous one, the lower number of interactions among decision variables substantially simpli…es the game solution. This is because the consumers know upfront the rebate they will obtain when returning the past-sold products, independently of their conditions. Some examples describing a …xed rebate is trade-in and save programs of BestBuy for used cell phones, of (the US and Canada) governments for used cars over 20 years old, and of H&M for used-clothes bins. The consumers
All stages of the games are solved in detail in the Appendix and summarized in the following propositions.
Proposition 6
With the exogenous rebate, the Markovian pricing strategies are given by:
Interestingly, we …nd that the …rst period decisions are independent of the customers' return decisions. This is because of the missing interface between the …rst and the second period strategies inside the return function that leads to a full independence of the …rst period prices (! when the rebate is the lowest and the number of the customers who dump the used product is the highest. Figure 6 shows the relationship between R's optimal pro…t function and the two key model parameters.
The retailer's pro…t function decreases in rebate k and increases in price sensitivity to returns . Note that period 1 under the two return functions is calculated below given the conditions i iv. 
Next the comparison of the …rst-period retail prices is as follows:
which must be positive because the term in Eq. Moreover we compare the second period prices under both return functions. We …nd that
whose signs can only be checked numerically (see Appendix 2.5). Considering all model parameters, the second period wholesale price under price-dependent rebate (or variable rebate) regime is lower than the price charged under the …xed rebate policy. As we observe from the expression (19) and Figure 8 the same result holds for the …rst period prices. This result is associated with the high rebate cost p 1 which depends on the …nal product price. Similarly, the second period retail price under the variable rebate policy is lower than the price under the …xed rebate policy, because of the high cost (i.e., ! M 2 < ! f M 2 ). Figure 9 demonstrates that the manufacturer's pro…t under variable rebate regime/policy is higher than its pro…t under the …xed rebate regime. This holds for all parameter regions and is due to the high prices charged under the …rst regime. This …gure also shows that the key parameter that impacts the di¤erence in the pro…ts is the rebate rate ( ) that is used under the …rst policy. The pro…t di¤erence (in favor of the …rst policy) increases at a decreasing rate in the rebate rate. While the …xed rebate k has a little impact on the pro…t di¤erence, the price sensitivity has more impact than to explain the pro…t di¤erence under the two types of rebate policies. In Figure 10 , we observe that the retailer is always better o¤ under the variable rebate policy.
Computational analysis of Markovian solutions
In this section, we fully compare the Markovian solutions under di¤erent rebate structures. This analysis is fully done numerically and considers all parameters. We start from a baseline set that consists of 1 = 2 = 1; According to Appendix 2.1, the following insights can be derived for the M -scenario:
-When the market potential in the …rst period, 1 ; increases, M experiences increasing pro…ts. This result derives from the variable rebate structure. Intuitively, increasing values of market potential lead to larger prices for both …rms. Nevertheless, larger retail prices have an impact on both the returns and the marginal rewards linked to it. While the returns always increase in the market potential because the number of consumers returning the product increases, the margins linked to returns can decrease in the …rst period price, p 1 , thus generating an overall issue of pro…tability of returns. The retailer is positively a¤ected by larger market potential although the manufacturer directly manages the deals with consumers. Thus, she experiences larger pro…ts due to the higher number of consumers in the …rst period. In sum, a variable rebate policy generates an important trade-o¤ between sales and returns due to the higher number of consumers in the …rst period.
-When the market potential in the second period, 2 ; increases, the manufacturer increases its pro…t.
This …nding comes from the impact of the second period prices on the returns. Larger prices have a negative in ‡uence on returns, which decrease in 2 : Increasing number of consumers in the second period entails an interesting trade-o¤ between forward and backward rewards. Forward rewards are always increasing because demand in the second period increases accordingly. However, the returns decrease in p 2 : Overall, the manufacturer is able to overcome this trade-o¤ by favoring forward pro…ts and denying the environmental performance.
-As expected, larger values of lead to lower prices and pro…ts. Interestingly, with the variable rebate structure the returns increase in due to decreasing prices. Thus, higher consumers sensitivity to price entails a trade-o¤ between forward and reverse ‡ows generating a demand increase in all periods and a decrease in the forward margins, while increasing the returns and the backward margins.
-Increasing values of the marginal collecting pro…ts, Mr = g p 1 , have a peculiar in ‡uence on the …rms strategies and pro…ts. While the prices in the …rst period increase in Mr , the second period prices decrease in its value. This disparity derives from the fact that all elements of Mr play a role on …rm strategies. In the …rst period, the manufacturer increases the wholesale price in Mr to make the returns margin lucrative. In fact, increasing wholesale price leads to higher retail price in the …rst period, and thus larger returns margins. So the CLSC compensates the ine¢ ciency due to returns by changing the pricing strategies accordingly. Nevertheless, increasing the prices also increases the number of returns. In the second period, increasing Mr intuitively leads to lower prices: …rms seek to boost as much returns as possible by decreasing the prices while focusing on the forward ‡ows. Interestingly, while the e¤ects of and g on returns are clear, the in ‡uence of the rebate p 1 on the returns substantially challenges the CLSC: contrary to g, increasing rebates leads to lower margins but increases the returns. Thus the CLSC should set the pricing strategies to manage the trade-o¤ between returns and pro…tability.
-When consumers consider the price di¤erence as an important element in their return decisions (e.g., through ); the prices strategies increase in the …rst period and decrease in the second period at all levels of the CLSC. This has a dual e¤ect within the supply chain: on one hand, increasing generates lower returns, thus the CLSC seeks to balance this loss by increasing the prices in the …rst period and reducing the prices in the second period. This strategy change has a negative impact on the forward ‡ows due to low sales in the …rst period and scarce returns in the second period. Thus, high values of make the return policy challenging for the entire CLSC, which needs some other additional strategies (e.g., advertising or service)
to counterbalance the e¤ect of price di¤erence in the consumers'returning decisions.
-While the discount factor does not in ‡uence the …rst period strategies at all, the second period prices increase in it. This deteriorates the prices from consumers'point of view, as such they will always pay more while diminishing the returns. Overall, increasing values of is economically sound while deteriorating the returns.
-The production costs c 1 and c 2 unsurprisingly decrease the pro…ts and increase the prices. The most interesting result links to the impact of these parameters on the return function: the returns increase in c 1 and decrease in c 2 . This peculiarity is linked to the rate of change of p 1 and p 2 with respect to c 1 and c 2 .
Increasing values of c 1 increase p 1 more than p 2 thus impacting the returns positively. In contrast, increasing values of c 2 increase p 2 more than p 1 , hence in ‡uencing the return rate negatively.
-Increasing values of the passive return rate, ; have positive e¤ect on the businesses overall, exempli…ed by increasing pro…ts, decreasing prices and increasing returns. Thus, CLSC should focus on regions in which consumers have a certain attitude of returning used goods, independent of the …rms'pricing strategies and return behavior. Accordingly, the following …ndings can be derived:
-When the market expands in the …rst period ( 1 ), the manufacturer prefers adopting a …xed rebate. In fact, he knows that the retailer will post higher prices thus deteriorating the returns margins and quantity.
Adopting a …xed rebate policy will make the manufacturer su¢ ciently safe from high prices charged by the retailer. On her side, the retailer prefers a variable rebate policy because it gives more power to her due to the in ‡uence of pricing on the returns function. From an environmental point of view, more people can return when the market expands, thus a variable rebate policy is more suitable to perform the environmental performance.
-When the market in the second period ( 2 ) expands, the …rms'strategies change with respect to the same level as in the …rst period. When the second period market becomes important, the manufacturer prefers a variable rebate because he can better control the return ‡ow by adjusting the wholesale price accordingly.
-When the consumers'sensitivity to price ( ) enlarges, both …rms prefer a variable rebate because they can adjust the rebate accordingly. In fact, a …xed rebate penalizes the pricing strategy to much and can lead to lower returns and sales over the entire planning horizon.
-The …rms show contrasting preferences according to the remanufacturing parameters and g. When remanufacturing is convenient, the manufacturer prefers a variable rebate policy to positively in ‡uence the returns and get positive pro…ts from remanufacturing. Instead, the retailer prefers a …xed rebate policy because her pricing strategies will be largely in ‡uenced by the wholesale price changes. Note that the retailer does not get any bene…ts from returns, which are fully retained by the manufacturer, hence the remanufacturing convenience is not balanced over the supply chain.
-Any increase in the marginal production costs leads both …rms to prefer a variable rebate policy. This result is somehow expected due to the fact that a …xed rebate policy penalizes the prices and imposes …rms to considerably adjust them to also consider the production costs. Under a variable rebate policy, this trade-o¤ can be better managed.
-Increasing values of the passive return rate ( ) leads …rms to prefer a variable rebate policy. This parameter plays the role of market expansion for returns, thus …rms can better exploit its bene…ts by adjusting the pricing policy and return strategy accordingly.
-When consumers evaluate the price di¤erence before deciding to return ( ); …rms have contrasting preferences relative to the return policy. The manufacturer prefers a variable rebate policy because he seeks to control the return function in both periods. The …xed rebate policy does not give any advantage to the …rst period strategies, thus he loses some control on the return function. When consumers disregard the price di¤erence and the rebate, the manufacturer can opt for a …xed rebate because the return function is simply less important. On her side, the retailer always prefers a …xed rebate because the wholesale price in the …rst period is not in ‡uenced by the remanufacturing parameters, thus preserving the CLSC from the double marginalization problem.
-Increasing values of the variable rebate ( ) will lead to divergent preferences. The manufacturer will always prefer a …xed rebate. Indeed, the manufacturer seeks to give back to consumers a rebate that is as low as possible because the rebate directly in ‡uences the remanufacturing pro…tability. Nevertheless, increasing lead to higher returns. From her side, the retailer prefers always larger because she can charge lower prices in the …rst period and larger prices in the second period, thus increasing her pro…ts.
-Increasing values of the …xed rebate (k) will make both …rms economically worse o¤. This …nding depends on the return structure and information availability. In this case, …rms must always provide the same amount independent of the …rms' strategies. 
Open-loop equilibrium market outcomes
We intend to examine the same CLSC game with endogeneous return functions in Eq. (2) and (3) R takes the wholesale price given and sells the same quantity it buys from M ) and evaluate the impact of current decisions on the future pro…ts given the available information at the beginning of the game.
Open-loop equilibrium with variable rebate (O-scenario)
Similar to the previous sections, we keep the leader-follower relationship between M and R in the CLSC.
The game formulation is as in (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) , which is solved in the proof of the following proposition in detail. There are two stages in the solution. In the …rst stage, R maximizes its pro…t function in (5) to choose both p 1 and p 2 functions (of wholesale prices) simultaneously. In the second stage, M optimally chooses both ! 1 and ! 2 by maximizing (4), given the R's strategies p 1 and
Under the open-loop approach, R ignores the indirect impact of p 2 and ! 2 on p 1 . Rather, R chooses p 1 and p 2 simultaneously. Therefore, while the leader-follower game structure is preserved, …rm(s) may lose the strategy update over the stages. However, as we show in the following subsection, it can be subgame perfect equilibrium to discard the strategy updates (i.e., R's ignorance of the impact of p 2 on p 1 ). Consequently, the …rms'strategies are characterized in the following proposition. 
! O 2 = 2 (3 1 + 4 ( 2 + c 2 )) + 2 2 (4 (g ) + c 1 ) + 2 ( 2 (4 + ) + 2 (2 c 2 ( + ( g))))
All prices in Eqs. (21) (22) (23) (24) are decreasing in and increasing in , as in the Markovian solution. Also, the …rst and the second period decisions are interlinked. That is, initial period decisions impact the current pro…ts as well as the future prices and the pro…ts. This is contrary to the independence of the …rst period decisions from the second period ones observed under the …xed rebate policy (that is, v function). Furthermore, the Proposition 8 Under the exogenous rebate, …rms' strategies do not vary according to the solution concepts (equilibrium types) adopted.
The intuition for this …nding is that the …rst period decisions ! 1 and p 1 are totally independent from the second period prices ! 2 and p 2 , when the rebate is …xed. The …rst period prices do not in ‡uence the second period decisions as well as the return decisions. Consequently, when the CLSC implements an exogenous rebate, the market outcomes are invariant to the solution concept adopted. The equilibrium strategies are as de…ned in Eqs. (13) (14) (15) (16) ).
Comparison of O and e O scenarios
The di¤erences between the open-loop strategies under the two di¤erent v (p 2 ) and r (p 1 ; p 2 ) return scenarios will only spring from the nature of rebate type (…xed versus variable rebate). To explore the impact of return function on market outcomes in the open-loop framework, we will compare the equilibrium prices under these return functions. The initial period wholesale prices compare as follows:
From Figure 11 , we observe that the variable rebate approach leads to higher wholesale price to be charged to the retailer such that ! O Next we compare the retail prices under the two rebate policies. We …nd that
The qualitative behavior of p O 1 p e O 1 will follow a similar shape as in Figure 11 , because the retail price di¤erence is linear in the wholesale price di¤erence. This …nding is also congruent to the one we obtained for the Markov perfect solution presented in Eq. (20) . = 4 (3 1 + (c 1 4k)) + (4 (( g) + ) + (3 2 + (c 2 8k ))) + 2 (g + k )
Similar to the Markovian prices, open-loop prices are also higher under the variable rebate approach.
That is, ! 2 and p 2 under O-scenario are always larger than those in the e O scenario. These higher prices would re ‡ect to higher pro…ts under the variable rebate approach, that is O scenario. In fact, he will prefer the implementation of a …xed rebate when consumers' take into consideration the di¤erence between the price of new releases and the rebate to return their used products. A variable rebate leaves the decision on the return basically to the retailer, whose strategies are only partially in ‡uenced by the wholesale price strategies due to the independence between strategies over time. Thus, a …xed rebate o¤ers the possibility to lower the retailer's in ‡uence and adjust the strategies accordingly when the CLSC plays open-loop.
Computational analysis of the Open-loop solution
-The manufacturer will prefer a …xed rebate policy according to the marginal production costs (c t ) in both periods. The separation between strategies over time allows the double marginalization e¤ect to decrease, thus the …xed rebate is much more manageable from an economic point of view. Given that M is a leader and handles the collection, he will choose to play Markovian strategy. However, if he precommits to its wholesale price decisions at the outset of the game, R will choose to precommit to its retail decisions as well. This (open-loop strategy) will hurt M and provide bene…t to R. But this will also hurt the consumers, as they will pay higher retailer prices under the precommitment strategy. Consequently, -The previous insights are corroborated by increasing values of returns parameters, namely, and :
When the consumers show a certain willingness to return the old goods as well as a certain attitude in evaluating the di¤erence between price of new products and rebates, M prefers the adoption of a Markovian concept to fully exploit the market potential linked to returns. Higher returns parameters also contributes positively to the environment under the Markovian concept. All these results also hold for increasing discount factor ( ) and marginal production costs (c t ).
To summarize, when consumers return behavior can be characterized by a variable rebate policy, a general trade-o¤ exists in the selection of the solution concept. The adoption of a Markovian solution concept makes M economically better-o¤ and leads to lower retail prices, thus being socially preferred. The implementation of Open-loop strategies makes R economically better-o¤ and leads to larger returns, thus being environmentally preferred. Thus, when the rebates are variable and depending on the …rst period price, the selection of the solution concept is a challenging tasks. However, because M is the chain leader, he will opt for the adoption of a Markovian concept. This opens a warning on the environmental impact of this policy as well as the deterioration of some economic bene…ts for the retailer.
Exogenous rebate case
Instead of implementing a variable rebate policy, the manufacturer can choose a …xed rebate for the used products as de…ned in v function. In this case, given the model parameter regions studied, we …nd that market outcomes (prices, outputs, and pro…ts) are identical under both equilibrium concepts. The main takeaway of this …nding is that the Open-loop strategies are indeed sub-game perfect. Put di¤erently, precommitting to the strategies (i.e., announcing all of the current and future prices at the beginning of the game) does not upset any …rm. Alternatively, sequential pricing decision process, which is state-dependent, has no advantage over the precommitment process. Because, there is no transition or interlink between the periods, and the …rst period decisions are completely irrelevant for the second period decisions, when M applies the …xed rebate policy and consumers return as in v function. In this case, it is imperative to know what would be the optimal rebate mechanism before they intend to o¤er a buy-back or a recycling program, because the payments to customers will directly impact their costs as well as the number of items to be re-manufactured. We explicitly entrench this rebate mechanism into the return function. We …nd that the variable rebate policy is optimal for the industry when We …nd that the time frame is irrelevant if the consumers base their return decisions according to the …xed rebate (as in v function). In this case, the …rst period decisions of …rms do not impact their future decisions and pro…ts. Therefore the game is reduced to a (repeated) static game. However, the market game will be fully dynamic, if the consumers base their return decisions with respect to variable rebate (as in r function).
Contributions and managerial insights
In that case, the …rst period strategies impact future decisions of all …rms and their pro…ts. An implication of this …nding for Lexmark (buying back used cartridges) is that o¤ering a variable rebate will complicate its pricing decisions as sophisticated consumers will impact the future product prices by their return decisions.
In light of these new …ndings, we o¤er some practical guidelines for …rms operating in CLSCs:
i) Acknowledge the existence of sophisticated consumers who respond di¤erently to di¤erent rebate mechanisms which will ultimately a¤ect the industry pro…ts and the number of returns.
ii) O¤er a variable rebate program rather than applying a …xed rebate as it is more pro…table when Markov strategies are implemented. If CLSCs seek to precommit their strategies, they should prefer an …xed rebate return policy;
iii) Take into account of the impact of information structure and the equilibrium solution concept on market outcomes (prices and pro…ts). Precommitting to decisions at the outset may not cause a loss of pro…t for …rms, but it is always preferable for them to consider the impact of current decisions on future outcomes as time evolves.
iv) Recognize the in ‡uence of the rebate type on the dynamic nature of market interactions. The game will be simpli…ed and formulated as a time-independent repeated static game, if the rebate is constant. Otherwise, decision making process will be complex, as pro…ts and prices will be time-dependent and interlinked. Although we have examined the CLSC games over two periods, they could be extended to T …nite periods.
In fact, if the …xed rebate policy (as in v function) is implemented in the market, then it does not matter how many periods we would have in the game. Furthermore, the Markov solution will coincide with the Open-loop solution for all …rms. This is because the decisions in a given period do not a¤ect the future decisions, and therefore the game can be solved as static game, repeated T times. However, when the variable rebate policy is implemented (as in r function), all decisions in all periods will be interlinked (period t decisions will impact period t + 1 decisions and outcomes). Therefore, the Markov perfect solution will diverge from the open-loop one. The Markovian strategies will facilitate higher pro…ts for the manufacturer as the leader will take into account of impact of current decisions on future pro…ts.
A future research direction could involve increasing the number of …rms in both upstream and downstream layers of the CLSC. The manufacturer has an incentive to sell its products to many retailers to eliminate the double marginalization problem in the current setting. We believe our results will hold if the downstream industry would be competitive. However, competition in the upstream industry as well as product di¤erentiation, and vertical controls would complicate the CLSC structure, but could lead to new managerial insights.
Appendix
Proof. of Proposition 1. The players optimize their objective functions over two periods, each of which is characterized by two stages. We seek to obtain a sub-game perfect Stackelberg equilibrium over the stages and the periods. When the rebate is variable, the players'optimization problems read as follows: M = ( 1 p 1 ) (! 1 c 1 ) + (( 2 p 2 ) (! 2 c 2 ) + ( (p 2 p 1 )) ( g p 1 )) R = ( 1 p 1 ) (p 1 ! 1 ) + ( 2 p 2 ) (p 2 ! 2 )
Because we have two stages per period, the course of the game is as follows:
Stage 4: To optimize her second period pro…t, R chooses the price p 2 : Assuming an interior solution, the retailer's reaction function takes the form p 2 (! 2 ) = 2 + ! 2 2
Stage 3: M optimizes its second period pro…ts by choosing the wholesale price ! 2 and taking R's reaction function into account. That leads M's pro…ts to become:
M 's …rst order necessary condition yields in the second period to:
> 0 and 2 = 2 > 0:
Substituting ! 2 in p 2 , the second-period price becomes: Stage 2: Moving to the …rst period, R optimally chooses its price p 1 to maximize its sum of discounted pro…ts. After substituting for ! 2 and p 2 ; the R's pro…ts becomes:
whose optimization with respect to p 1 gives:
2 (1+ 4( 4 2)) > 0 and 6 = 2 (1+ 4( 4 2)) > 0: Substituting p 1 (! 1 )
into the second period strategies we obtain: p 2 = 3 + 4 5 + 4 6 ! 1 ! 2 = 1 + 2 5 + 2 6 ! 1 = ( 7 + 8 ! 1 )
where 7 = ( 1 + 2 5 ) > 0 and 8 = 2 6 > 0.
Stage 1: Plugging ! 2 (! 1 ) and p 1 (! 1 ) into the M 's objective functional gives:
while the optimization with respect to ! 1 yields: Substitute ! 1 into the other strategies to …nd the other prices.
Proof. Proposition 6. The players optimize their objective functions over two periods, each of which is characterized by two stages. We seek to obtain a sub-game perfect Stackelberg equilibrium over the stages and the periods. When the rebate is exogenous, the players'optimization problems read as follows: M = ( 1 p 1 ) (! 1 c 1 ) + (( 2 p 2 ) (! 2 c 2 ) + ( (p 2 k)) ( g k)) R = ( 1 p 1 ) (p 1 ! 1 ) + ( 2 p 2 ) (p 2 ! 2 )
Stage 4: To optimize her second period pro…t, R chooses the price p 2 : Assuming an interior solution, the retailer's reaction function takes the form
M 's …rst order necessary condition yields in the second period gives:
Substituting ! 2 in p 2 , the second-period price becomes:
Stage 2: Moving to the …rst period, R optimally chooses its price p 1 to maximize its sum of discounted pro…ts. The optimal p 1 can be obtained even without substituting the second period optimal strategies into the R's objective function as there is no interdependence between …rst and second period strategies. The optimization with respect to p 1 gives:
Stage 1: By plugging p 1 (! 1 ) into the M 's objective functional and taking the derivative with respect to ! 1 gives: :
so that the optimal retail price becomes:
Proof. of Proposition 7. The players maximize their objective functions to choose all period decisions at the outset of the game.
We will obtain open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium over two stages. When the rebate is variable, the players'optimization problems read as follows:
Stage 2: As the retailer is follower we start with R's maximization problem. To optimize her pro…ts, R simultaneously chooses the prices p 1 and p 2 : Assuming an interior solution, the retailer's reaction function takes the form p 1 (! 1 ) = 1 + ! 1 2 p 2 (! 2 ) = 2 + ! 2 2
Stage 1: Next M optimizes its total pro…t function by simultaneously choosing the wholesale prices ! 1 and ! 2 , taking R's reaction functions given. This leads to the following M 's pro…t function:
Maximizing this function with respect to the wholesale price strategies we obtain: ! 1 = 2 4 2 c 1 + g 2 4 + 2 ( (4 ( g) + c 2 ) + 3 2 ) + 1 8 2 + 2 ( 8 )
! 2 = 2 (3 1 + 4 ( 2 + c 2 )) + 2 2 (4 (g ) + c 1 ) + 2 ( 2 (4 + ) + 2 (2 c 2 ( + ( g)))) 16 2 + 2 (8 ) open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium over the stages. When the rebate is exogenous, the players'optimization problems read as follows: M = ( 1 p 1 ) (! 1 c 1 ) + (( 2 p 2 ) (! 2 c 2 ) + ( (p 2 k)) ( g k)) R = ( 1 p 1 ) (p 1 ! 1 ) + ( 2 p 2 ) (p 2 ! 2 )
Stage 1: To optimize her second period pro…t, R chooses the prices p 1 and p 2 : Assuming an interior solution, the retailer's reaction function takes the form
Stage 2: M optimizes its second period pro…ts by choosing the wholesale prices ! 1 and ! 2 and taking R's reaction functions into account. That leads M 's pro…ts to become:
By pluging ! 1 and ! 2 into the prices, the R's strategies read:
